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ORGANIZED CRIME AND NATIONAL SECURITY :
A DUBIOUS CONNECTION?
Liz Campbell*
This article problematizes the growing tendency to characterize organized crime
as a national security threat, referring primarily to the situation in the United
Kingdom but also drawing on international and comparative examples. Three
distinct arguments are presented contesting this comparison. First, it is ques-
tionable whether either concept is sufﬁciently clear in a deﬁnitional sense for the
comparison to be meaningful analytically. The second empirical argument
suggests that organized crime, as it is deﬁned and encountered usually in the
United Kingdom, does not yet constitute such a threat. Third, and regardless of
the validity of the preceding arguments, it is argued in a normative sense that
such a comparison should be resisted to the greatest extent possible, given the
extraordinary legal consequences it entails. These claims indicate how caution
must be exercized in making such a connection.
Keywords: organized crime, national security, criminal behaviour
*Dr. Liz Campbell is senior lecturer in criminal law and evidence at the University of
Edinburgh. She received her doctorate in law from University College Cork, National
University of Ireland. Her research focuses on organized crime, the presumption of inno-
cence, and criminal procedure more broadly.
Thanks to Christine Haddow for research assistance. Previous drafts of this paper were
improved greatly by comments and questions from Conor Gearty, Thom Brookes, Andrew
Cornford, Chloe Kennedy, Lindsay Farmer, and participants at the Society of Legal
Scholars conference and the Socio-legal Studies Association conference. All errors are of
course my own.
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I N TRODUCT ION
It is not uncommon to see organized crime described as a national security
threat, in political discourse and in ofﬁcial documents, at both domestic
and international levels. So organized crime appears to straddle a number of
worlds: it is a form of crime, but also has in some respects moved to being
a political issue, and on to a matter of national security. This elevation has
certain consequences, including the allocation of greater resources, the
creation of speciﬁc state entities, the alteration of police operations,1 and
a deeper involvement of intelligence agencies.2 Much has been written on
the empirical dimensions of organized crime as a national security threat,
and on the ramiﬁcations of this for investigative tactics in different juris-
dictions; less attention has been paid to the potential legal procedural
consequences. Although this article takes the context and law in the United
Kingdom as its primary focus, the arguments presented are relevant in
a comparative sense and resonate broadly.
This article begins by identifying the growing trend worldwide whereby
organized crime is seen as threatening states themselves. This may be
characterized as the ‘‘securitization’’ of organized crime, a phenomenon
that is evident in some jurisdictions like the Republic of Ireland. Political
and executive discourse indicates that the United Kingdom is on the cusp of
a shift in terms of connecting organized crime to national security. This
article challenges the comparison in the British context, presenting three
discrete arguments in this regard. First, it is questionable whether either
concept can be deﬁned clearly, thereby undermining the analytical meaning
or value of such a comparison. The second empirical argument is that
1. See Clive Harﬁeld, Paradigm Not Procedure: Current Challenges to Police Cultural
Incorporation of Human Rights in England and Wales 4 PUB. SPACE: J.L. & SOC. JUST. 91,
92 (2009); James Sheptycki, Global Law Enforcement as a Protection Racket: Some Sceptical
Notes on Transnational Organised Crime as an Object of Global Governance, in TRANSNA-
TIONAL ORGANISED CRIME: PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL SECURITY 42–59 (Adam Edwards
& Peter Gill eds., 2006); LES JOHNSTON & CLIFFORD SHEARING, GOVERNING SECURITY:
EXPLORATIONS IN POLICING AND JUSTICE (2002); Conor O’Reilly & Graham Ellison, ‘‘Eye
Spy Private High’’: Re-Conceptualizing High Policing Theory, 46 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY
641–60 (2006).
2. The Security Service Act 1996 amended the function of the Security Service to act in
support of the activities of police forces and other law enforcement agencies in the prevention
and detection of serious crime. It works with the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA),
which was established in 2006 by the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005.
ORGANIZED CR IME AND NAT IONAL SECUR ITY | 221
organized crime, as it is deﬁned and encountered usually in the United
Kingdom, does not yet constitute such a threat. Third, and regardless of the
validity or persuasiveness of the preceding arguments, it is argued in a nor-
mative sense that such a comparison should be resisted, given the extraor-
dinary legal consequences it entails. Deploying the notion of national
security has different legal impacts, in terms of the creation of law, the
application of existing law, and ultimately derogation from the law. Overall,
these arguments resonate in jurisdictions beyond the United Kingdom, and
given these legal implications, caution is warranted before this comparison is
adopted and then acted upon.
I . ORGAN IZED CR IME AS A NAT IONAL SECUR I TY
THREAT—THE INTERNAT IONAL CONTEXT
Organized crime is viewed by scholars and practitioners alike as an espe-
cially sophisticated, systematic, and grave form and means of criminality;
nonetheless, until relatively recently it was seen globally as a matter of law
enforcement that could be addressed through the usual processes and
channels of criminal investigation and prosecution. This view began to
shift in the 1980s, when it was felt that organized crime underwent a trans-
formation to something that could jeopardize ‘‘the viability of societies, the
independence of governments, the integrity of ﬁnancial institutions, and
the functioning of democracy.’’3 In particular, throughout the 1990s trans-
national organized crime rose on the policy agenda of the United States and
was redeﬁned as a security issue; this characterization was met with acqui-
escence by other national governments.4 In essence, what occurred was
a replacement of the dangers associated with the Cold War with the notion
of transnational organized crime,5 and a shift from viewing organized crime
3. Phil Williams & Ernesto Savona, Problems and Dangers Posed by Transnational
Organized Crime in the Various Regions of the World, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME, 1–42, 2 (1996).
4. PETER ANDREAS & ETHAN NADELMANN, POLICING THE GLOBE: CRIMINALIZA-
TION AND CRIME CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 158 (2006).
5. Adam Edwards & Peter Gill, The politics of transnational organised crime: Discourse
reﬂexivity and the narration of threat, 4 BRIT. J. POL. & INT’L REL. 245–70, 252 (2002);
ANDREAS & NADELMANN, supra note 4, at 158; David Felsen & Akis Kalaitzidis, A His-
torical Overview of Transnational Crime, in HANDBOOK OF TRANSNATIONAL CRIME &
JUSTICE 3–19, 3 (Philip L. Reichel ed., 2005).
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as a criminal law or criminological challenge to a matter of national
security.6
This perception soon gained force internationally, and in 1994 the
Naples Political Declaration and Global Action Plan against Organized
Transnational Crime expressed deep concern ‘‘about the dramatic growth
of organized crime over the past decade and about its global reach, which
constitute a threat to the internal security and stability of sovereign
States.’’7 The context and nature of crime were deemed to have changed,
resulting in large part from the forces of globalization, which also altered
the responses needed.8 So, it is now commonplace to describe organized
crime as something that threatens the state as well as individuals or a peo-
ple.9 In this vein, the European Commission views organized crime as
a potential threat to the union’s internal security,10 while the United
Nations has spoken about the evolution of transnational organized crime
into a strategic threat to governments, civil societies and economies.11
I I . THE SECUR I T I ZAT ION OF ORGAN IZED CR IME
Building on such rhetoric, it appears that organized crime has been ‘‘secu-
ritized’’ in some jurisdictions. Securitization is a concept developed by
6. Thomas Naylor, From Cold War to Crime war: The search for a new ‘‘national security
threat’’, 1 TRANSNAT’L ORGANIZED CRIME 37–56, 38.
7. Report of the World Ministerial Conference on Organized Transnational Crime, Naples
Political Declaration and Global Action Plan against Organized Transnational Crime, { 5
(Nov. 21–23, 1994), http://www.imolin.org/imolin/naples.html. Also see L. Shelley, Trans-
national organized crime: An imminent threat to the nation-state?, 48 J. INT’L AFF. 463–89
(1995).
8. Birmingham Group of Eight Summit Statement: Drugs and International Crime
(May 16, 1998), http://www.library.utoronto.ca/g7/summit/1998birmingham/drugs.htm.
9. See Christopher D. Ram, Meeting the challenge of crime in the global village: An
assessment of the role and future of the United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice, 30 (HEUNI Report Series No. 73, 2012), http://www.heuni.ﬁ/en/index/
publications.html.
10. European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament and the Council, The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards
a more secure Europe (Brussels, 22.11.2010 COM(2010) 673 ﬁnal), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri¼COM:2010:0673:FIN:EN:PDF.
11. United Nations Ofﬁce on Drugs and Crime, Action Against Transnational Organized
Crime and Illicit Trafﬁcking, Including Drug Trafﬁcking 2011–2013, 10 (Apr. 2011).
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Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde,12 and essentially is the characterization and
acceptance of certain issues as security threats. Securitization may be
deﬁned more precisely as the positioning through political speech acts of
a particular issue as a threat to the survival of a given entity, which in turn
(with the consent of the relevant constituency) enables the suspension of
‘‘normal politics’’ to deal with it.13 The invocation of security is a political
choice that allows the state to exercise special powers to handle an existen-
tial threat to a particular object, and may ultimately lead to less democratic
control and constraint.14
The entity or object under threat need not be the nation-state, but could
be a people or society, for example. As will be considered further below, the
most orthodox types of threat are to national security, which is described
by Buzan et al. as that with a focus on ‘‘the political, institutional unit—the
state—and accordingly on the political and military sections.’’15 They
distinguish this from ‘‘societal security,’’ which is closely related to but
distinct from political security.
For securitization to take place, the audience or constituency must
accept the political presentation of something as a threat to a particular
object.16 In other words, political discourse is not sufﬁcient, though it is
a necessary move toward securitization. As Richards notes, security is
a constructed concept for any given state at any given time, and various
political factors and the media will play a role in deﬁning the issues high-
lighted as security concerns.17 Then, the ‘‘facilitating conditions’’ that will
contribute to the success of a securitizing move include the position of the
person communicating the matter and the degree to which the particular
threat has historical resonance.18
12. See BARRY BUZAN, OLE WÆVER, & JAAP DE WILDE, SECURITY: A NEW FRAME-
WORK FOR ANALYSIS (1998); BARRY BUZAN, PEOPLE, STATES & FEAR: AN AGENDA FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES IN THE POST–COLD WAR ERA (1991).
13. Matt McDonald, Securitization and the Construction of Security, 14 EUR. J. INT’L
REL. 563–87, 567 (2008).
14. BUZAN, supra note 12, at 21 and 29.
15. BUZAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 119.
16. Id. at 25.
17. JULIAN RICHARDS, A GUIDE TO NATIONAL SECURITY: THREATS, RESPONSES AND
STRATEGIES 14 (2012).
18. Ole Wæver, The EU as a security actor: Reﬂections from a pessimistic constructivist on
post-sovereign security orders, in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY AND THE POLITICS
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Although the notion of securitization has been criticized for its focus on
speech acts rather than other means of communication,19 still it remains
a valuable means of conceptualizing the characterization of certain situa-
tions or states of affairs by numerous national administrations. For
instance, immigration is an issue that is often securitized.20 Politicians
depict immigrants and the phenomenon of immigration as threatening
in various respects to citizens and the community, and this situation is
deemed to warrant emergency measures. Moreover, policy makers and the
executive now seem to designate organized crime as an existential threat to
the state, thereby securitizing the issue, and claiming a special right to use
whatever means necessary to block it.
The political depiction and subsequent public acceptance of organized
crime as a security threat is evident in places like the Republic of Ireland,
Mexico, and the United States. This has resulted in alterations to legal
frameworks and the adoption of more militarized modes of policing.21 In
Ireland, for example, the securitization of organized crime has lead to the
use and imitation of counterterrorism measures.22 There, parallels between
organized crime and terrorism have long been drawn, and it is perceived
that organized crime represents a criminal justice crisis beyond that
encountered normally: ‘‘Gangland crime constitutes an attack on the State
in much the same way as the IRA [Irish Republican Army] attacked the
foundations of the State for many years.’’23 This claim in the Republic of
OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: POWER, SECURITY AND COMMUNITY 250–94(Morten
Kelstrup & Michael C. Williams eds., 2000).
19. Michael C. Williams, Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International
Politics, 47 INT’L STUD. Q. 511–31 (2003).
20. McDonald, supra note 13, at 567.
21. See Luis Astorga & David A. Shirk,Drug Trafﬁcking Organizations and Counter-Drug
Strategies in the U.S.-Mexican Context, in Mexico and the United States: Confronting the
Twenty-First Century (USMEX WP 10-01), http://usmex5.ucsd.edu/assets/024/11632.pdf;
Peter Andreas & Richard Price, From War Fighting to Crime Fighting: Transforming the
American National Security State, 3 INT’L STUD. REV. 31–52 (2001).
22. See Michael Mulqueen, Securing the State with Soldier Spies: Evaluating the Risks of
Using Military Personnel to Gather Surveillance Evidence in Ireland, 20 IRISH STUD. INT’L
AFF. 121–41 (2009). On the use of counter terrorism measures, see Dermot Walsh, The
Impact of Anti-Subversive Laws on Police Powers and Practices in Ireland, 62 TEMPLE L. REV.
1099, 1101 (1989); SHANE KILCOMMINS & BARRY VAUGHAN, TERRORISM, RIGHTS AND
THE RULE OF LAW: NEGOTIATING STATE JUSTICE IN IRELAND 79ff. (2007).
23. 681 DA´IL DEBATES col. 373 (Apr.29, 2009) per Peter Power.
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Ireland is explained by reference to the rise in drugs and ﬁrearms offenses,
low detection and prosecution rates for gun homicides in particular,24 and
because of the link between paramilitary actors and a burgeoning ‘‘gun
culture.’’25 As a result of this conception of the extent and nature of
organized crime, in the Republic of Ireland some such suspects are arrested
and detained, and trials held, under counterterrorism legislation.26 Fur-
thermore, unorthodox tactics that once were used against terrorists, such as
prolonged detention27 and asset forfeiture,28 have been emulated in legis-
lation applying to drugs offenses and a broader range of crime. All of this
underlines the signiﬁcant ramiﬁcations the securitization of organized
crime has for due process.
I I I . ORGAN IZED CR IME AS A NAT IONAL SECUR ITY
THREAT—THE BR I T ISH STORY
Jack Straw, as the U.K.’s Shadow Home Secretary, claimed in 1996, ‘‘We
have not yet reached the situation—I pray that we never will—where
organized crime is a threat to our national security.’’29 Political understand-
ing and discourse in the United Kingdom have changed somewhat since
then. Organized crime no longer is deemed to harm individual well-being
and security only—it is regarded as posing harm to communities30 and the
economy.31 Overall the link between organized crime and national security
is gaining political traction in the United Kingdom.32 A Home Ofﬁce
24. See Liz Campbell, Responding to Gun Crime in Ireland, 50 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY
414–34 (2010).
25. See 667 DA´IL DEBATES col. 539 (Nov. 18, 2008); 677 DA´IL DEBATES col. 724 (Mar.
11, 2009); 603 DA´IL DEBATES col. 1171 (June 2, 2005); CIARAN MCCULLAGH, CRIME IN
IRELAND 37 (1996).
26. Offence Against the State Act 1939 (Republic of Ireland).
27. See Criminal Justice (Drug Trafﬁcking) Act 1997 (Republic of Ireland).
28. See Proceeds of Crime Act 1996 (Republic of Ireland).
29. 271 HANSARD DEBATES, H.C. (Feb. 14, 1996): col. 1070, Mr. Straw.
30. Home Ofﬁce, One Step Ahead: A 21st Century Strategy to Defeat Organised Crime 9
(Cm 6167) (2004).
31. Serious Organised Crime Agency, Annual Plan 2012/13, 8.
32. In the U.S. context, see National Security Council, Strategy to Combat Transnational
Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security (July 2011). Similar
comparisons are drawn in Australia; see Mark Findlay, Organised Crime as Terrorism, 58
AUSTRALIAN Q. 286–96 (1996).
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White Paper in 2004 explicitly drew a connection between organized crime
and terrorism, speaking of the need for equivalent reactions:
Organised crime groups share many characteristics with terrorists, including
tight knit structures and the preparedness to use ruthless measures to achieve
their objectives. . . .A successful approach to organised crime is therefore
inseparable from our wider effort against threats to national security.33
More recently, organized crime has been described in the U.K. Parliament
as a question of national security34; the threat facing the United Kingdom
from terrorism, hostile action by other states and organized crime has been
stressed,35 as has the importance of conﬁdential intelligence sharing on
matters of national security against organized crime.36
Furthermore, dealing with organized crime as a national security threat
is an electoral priority: the Conservative Manifesto 2010 refers to the refo-
cusing of the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) to ‘‘enhance
national security . . . and crack down on the trafﬁcking of people, weapons
and drugs’’37; the Liberal Democrats spoke of the emergence of ‘‘[n]ew
security threats . . .whilst terrorists and organised criminals exploit inter-
national networks’’38; and Labour assessed the threat from ‘‘Terrorism and
organised crime.’’39 All of this indicates the political purchase of such
a view.
In terms of executive description, transnational organized crime was
deemed to be a key security challenge in the U.K.’s National Security
Strategy of 2008.40 This document presented (in rather convoluted terms)
the threat of serious and organized crime as ‘‘high and causing signiﬁcant
33. Home Ofﬁce, One Step Ahead, supra note 30, at 1.
34. Written Ministerial Statements, 13 July 2009: Column 2WS, Home Department,
Serious Organised Crime Strategy per the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the
Home Department (Mr. Alan Campbell).
35. 741HANSARD DEBATES, H.L. (Nov. 29, 2012): col. WS27, National Security Strategy
and Strategic Defence and Security Review Statement, The Chancellor of the Duchy of
Lancaster (Lord Strathclyde).
36. 557 HANSARD DEBATES, H.C., (Jan. 28, 2013), col. 537W, per Jeremy Browne.
37. The Conservative manifesto 2010: Invitation to join the government of Britain, 57.
38. Liberal Democrat manifesto 2010, 57.
39. The Labour party manifesto 2010: A Future Fair for All, 5:5.
40. Cabinet Ofﬁce, The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an
interdependent world 13 (Cm 7291) (2008).
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damage to the United Kingdom,’’ yet ‘‘not the pervasive threat which it is
in some parts of the world,’’ ‘‘[h]owever, even in the United Kingdom it is
a serious and fast-moving threat.’’41 Notably, the most recent National
Security Strategy of 2010 does not have a separate section on transnational
organized crime as in the 2008 document.42 Nonetheless it speaks of
organized crime as one of a number of ‘‘signiﬁcant transnational threats
that require our attention’’ and as ‘‘affect[ing] our interests and the lives
of our people at home and abroad.’’43 The National Security Council
considers ‘‘a signiﬁcant increase in the level of organised crime affecting
the UK’’ to be in ‘‘tier two’’ of risks facing the United Kingdom (with tier
one being the highest), bearing in mind both likelihood and impact.44
The observation in the National Security Strategy that organized crime is
one of the ‘‘greatest threats’’ to national security was cited by the Home
Ofﬁce in 2011,45 and reiterated in Parliament by the Home Secretary.46
So this rhetoric reaches across different political parties and branches of
government.
I V . A MATTER OF DEF IN I T ION
The ﬁrst argument presented in opposition to this characterization of
organized crime is a deﬁnitional one. It is suggested that the nebulous
nature of both ‘‘organized crime’’ and ‘‘national security’’ means that com-
paring the two is not meaningful analytically. Though reference is made to
the British situation speciﬁcally, this conceptual argument is applicable in
a broader context.
41. Id. at 13. For critique, see Michael Woodiwiss & Richard Hobbs, Organized evil and
the Atlantic alliance: Moral panics and the rhetoric of organized crime policing in America and
Britain, 49 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 106–28, 123 (2009).
42. Cabinet Ofﬁce, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security
Strategy (Cm 7953) (2010).
43. Id. at 14.
44. Id. at 27.
45. Home Ofﬁce, A Plan for the Creation of a National Crime-Fighting Capability 4 (Cm
8097) (2011).
46. 529 HANSARD DEBATES, H.C. (June 8, 2011), col. 232, per the Secretary of State for
the Home Department (Mrs. Theresa May).
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A. Organized Crime
Despite its popular use, there is no ‘‘agreed-upon’’ deﬁnition of organized
crime,47 and many variants have been proposed in the academic, legal, and
political spheres. Organized crime may mean structures, networks, or orga-
nizations that are involved in criminality; the provision of illegal goods or
services; or certain types of crimes of a given level of gravity.48 In other
words, the term may embrace both the ‘‘who’’ and the ‘‘what.’’49 A dom-
inant global understanding of organized crime developed from Cressey’s
work on the Maﬁa in the United States in the mid-twentieth century,50
which identiﬁed and categorized strict command structures and hierarchies,
uniﬁed norms, and a collective identity.51However, this socially constructed
image52 is not borne out in empirical studies, either of Maﬁa groups or of
criminal activities in other Western countries, which are carried out by
‘‘often ephemeral enterprises.’’53 On this basis, there is now a shift in aca-
demic focus toward the illegality of the activities or enterprise undertaken, in
addition to the nature and structure of the group responsible.54
47. Petrus van Duyne, The Phantom and Threat of Organized Crime, 24 CRIME, L. &
SOC. CHANGE 341, 343 (1996). Also see Federico Varese, What is Organized Crime?, in
ORGANIZED CRIME: CRITICAL CONCEPTS IN CRIMINOLOGY 1–33 (F. Varese ed., 2010);
FrankE.Hagan,TheOrganizedCrimeContinuum:AFurther Speciﬁcation of aNewConceptual
Model, 8CRIM. JUST. REV. 52 (1983); and Frank E. Hagan, ‘‘Organized Crime’’ and ‘‘organized
crime’’: Indeterminate Problems of Deﬁnition, 9 TRENDS IN ORGANIZED CRIME 127 (2006).
48. Letizia Paoli & Cyrille Fijnaut, Organised Crime and Its Control Policies, 14 EUR.
J. CRIME, CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST. 307, 308 (2006); Neil Hamilton-Smith & Simon
Mackenzie, The geometry of shadows: A critical review of organised crime risk assessments, 20
POLICING & SOC. 257, 261 (2010).
49. Michael Woodiwiss, Organized Crime—The Dumbing of Discourse, in 3 BRITISH
CRIMINOLOGY CONFERENCE: SELECTED PROCEEDINGS 3–4 (Liverpool, July 1999).
50. DONALD CRESSEY, THEFT OF THE NATION: THE STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS
OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN AMERICA 72 (1969). Also seeH. ABADINSKY, ORGANIZED CRIME
3 (9th ed. 2010).
51. See LETIZIA PAOLI, MAFIA BROTHERHOODS: ORGANIZED CRIME, ITALIAN STYLE
4, 21, 220 (2003).
52. See Mike Levi, The Organization of Serious Crimes for Gain, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGY 595–622 (Mike Maguire, Rod Morgan, & Robert Reiner
eds., 5th ed., 2012).
53. PAOLI, supra note 51, at 224; Dick Hobbs, Going Down the Glocal: The Local Context
of Organised Crime, 37 HOWARD J. CRIM. JUST. 407, 415 (1998).
54. ALAN BLOCK & WILLIAM CHAMBLISS, ORGANIZING CRIME 13 (1981); JOSEPH
ALBINI, THE AMERICAN MAFIA: GENESIS OF A LEGEND (1971); Albert K. Cohen, The
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Whether organized crime is interpreted in a structural or substantive
way, it appears to be motivated by the accumulation of wealth. Though the
evasion or neutering of state control and the corruption of ofﬁcials may
assist in the criminal enterprise, the generation of proﬁt and the control of
illicit markets is the primary focus for organized crime rather than any
grasping of power for political ends.55 Thus, the replacement or usurpation
of the government and governance of a geographical area is not a central
identifying or necessary feature.
The absence of ideology as such distinguishes organized crime from
terrorist groups and activities.56 Though the deﬁnition of terrorism is
elusive also, it centers on violence motivated by political, ideological, or
philosophical considerations, aimed at civilians to generate fear and cause
damage and to coerce a government to act in a particular manner.57 Crit-
ically for present purposes, this distinction between organized crime and
terrorism is becoming less clear in real terms, and sometimes there is a nexus
in terms of the personnel involved: organized crime groups may supply
illegal arms to terrorist groups, and terrorists may seek to generate funds
through the sale of illegal goods and services. ‘‘Narco-terrorism’’ is becom-
ing more prevalent globally and ranges from facilitation of trafﬁcking
through corruption of ofﬁcials to involvement in the actual trafﬁcking
itself.58 Moreover, groups may develop into hybrid entities that involve
both dimensions of organized crime and terrorism, or may involve the
transformation from one to the other.59 For example, a link between
terrorist organizations and organized crime in Northern Ireland has been
Concept of Criminal Organisation, 17 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 97, 98 (1977); Michael Maltz,
On Deﬁning ‘‘Organized Crime’’: The Development of a Deﬁnition and a Typology, 22 CRIME
& DELINQUENCY 338 (1976). Also see FRANK E. HAGAN, CRIME TYPES AND CRIMINALS
300 (2010); James O. Finckenauer, Problems of Deﬁnition: What is Organized Crime?, 8
TRENDS IN ORGANIZED CRIME 63, 81 (2005).
55. See Philip Gounev & Tihomir Bezlov, Examining the Links Between Organised Crime
and Corruption (European Commission, 2010).
56. Finckenauer, supra note 54, at 65.
57. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 167 (2nd ed. 2008).
58. ABADINSKY, supra note 50, at 6; Tamara Makarenko, The Crime-Terror Continuum:
Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism, 6 GLOBAL
CRIME 129–45 (2004).
59. Louise Shelley, John Picarelli, et al., Methods and Motives: Exploring Links between
Transnational Organized Crime & International Terrorism (U.S. Department of Justice, No.
211207, Sept. 2005).
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identiﬁed,60 with persons previously involved in terrorism now using local
and international networks to advance their criminal aims. Former sub-
versives are seen to become involved in armed robbery for personal gain, as
‘‘criminal entrepreneurs’’61 who will engage in any activity if the potential
proﬁt is sufﬁciently high; their knowledge about weaponry may be dissem-
inated to other criminal groups, or they may be involved in the supply of
weapons.62 Undoubtedly the line between organized crime and terrorism
often is unclear.
No statutory deﬁnition of organized crime exists in the United King-
dom.63 Rather, the Home Ofﬁce states:
Organised crime involves individuals, normally working with others, with
the capacity and capability to commit serious crime on a continuing basis,
which includes elements of planning, control and coordination, and beneﬁts
those involved. The motivation is often, but not always, ﬁnancial gain.64
Thus, organized crime in this context refers to people (the ‘‘who’’),
although they need to be involved in certain types of acts (the ‘‘what’’).
The Home Ofﬁce concedes that a ‘‘spectrum of organisation’’ exists for
criminal groups and that ‘‘no clear cut-off point’’ exists for determining
whether any group should be categorized as being involved in organized
crime.65 Furthermore, it acknowledges that many organized criminal
groups are loose networks of criminals who come together for the duration
of a particular criminal activity.66 This underlines the nebulous deﬁnition
60. An Garda Sı´ocha´na & Police Service of Northern Ireland, A Cross Border Organised
Crime Assessment 2008, 6 (Northern Ireland Ofﬁce and Department of Justice, 2008);
Organised Crime Task Force, 2011 Annual Report & Threat Assessment Organised Crime in
Northern Ireland 16 (Northern Ireland Ofﬁce, 2011).
61. Select Committee on Northern Ireland Affairs, Eighth Report: The Illegal Drugs Trade
and Drug Culture in Northern Ireland { 64 (2003).
62. Select Committee on Northern Ireland Affairs, Organised Crime in Northern Ireland,
ch. 2, {{ 11–23 (2006); Select Committee, supra note 61, at { 65.
63. ‘‘Serious organised crime’’ is deﬁned in the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland)
Act 2010 (Scotland) as crime involving two or more persons acting together for the principal
purpose of committing or conspiring to commit a serious offense or a series of such.
64. Home Ofﬁce, Local to Global: Reducing the Risk from Organised Crime 5 (2011).
65. Home Ofﬁce, One Step Ahead, supra note 30, at { 1.1.
66. Home Ofﬁce, Extending Our Reach: A Comprehensive Approach to Tackling Serious
Organised Crime 7 (2009).
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of organized crime, explaining the reluctance on the part of the West-
minster Parliament to legislate in this respect.
There is no mention in any of these academic and policy deﬁnitions of
jurisdictional matters, which may prove critical in ascertaining whether
national security indeed is or is likely to be threatened. Organized crime
often is a cross-border phenomenon67; the importation of controlled goods
by deﬁnition is so, and organized crime groups often exploit national
differences in laws, regulations, and taxes to establish illegal markets and
generate proﬁts. This international dimension permits some criminal
groups to increase the range and depth of their activities, and also necessi-
tates cross-border cooperation by investigating and prosecuting authorities.
Nonetheless, organized crime also may be entirely or predominantly
national or local in nature.68
‘‘Transnational’’ organized crime is the term most often used to describe
organized crime with cross-border dimensions. Mueller spoke of ‘‘transna-
tional crime’’ as criminal phenomena that transcend international borders,
transgress the laws of several states, or have an impact on another country69;
transnational crime usually is organized, but not necessarily so. The con-
cept of transnational organized crime emerged ‘‘from relative obscurity’’ in
the 1990s, and soon was described dramatically by the Secretary General of
the United Nations as involving the ‘‘forces of darkness.’’70 Though no
formal deﬁnition exists in the United Kingdom, the U.N. Convention
against Transnational Organised Crime (which the United Kingdom has
signed and ratiﬁed) deems an offense to be transnational in nature if com-
mitted in more than one state; if it is committed in one state but a substan-
tial part of its preparation, planning, direction or control takes place in
another state; if it is committed in one state but involves an organized
criminal group that engages in criminal activities in more than one state;
or if it is committed in one state but has substantial effects in another.71
67. PETRUS VAN DUYNE, ORGANIZED CRIME IN EUROPE (1996).
68. See Hobbs, supra note 53.
69. Gerhard Mueller, Transnational Crime: Deﬁnitions and Concepts, in COMBATING
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME: CONCEPTS, ACTIVITIES, AND RESPONSES 13 (Phil Williams &
Dimitri Vlassis eds., 2001) 13.
70. Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, Transnational crime: the market and the rule of law (Tran-
script, Dec. 15, 1994).
71. U.N. Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, Article 3(2), G.A. Res. 55/
25, U.N. Doc. A/Res/55/25 (Nov. 10, 2000).
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The boundary between organized crime and transnational organized
crime is a porous one. Criticism has been made of the use of the latter
term as mere shorthand for organized crime groups with an international
dimension, which is regarded as different from being truly transnational in
terms of structure and operation. To this end, Wright distinguishes
between international and transnational organized crime, where the latter
concerns major crime groups centered in no single location but with opera-
tions in many, whereas the former merely involves acts that extend across
a national border.72 As well as vagueness in the concept of transnational
organized crime itself, it of course inherits the ambiguity in organized crime
outlined above. Moreover, transnational organized crime is seen by some as
a politicized concept,73 given its dominant characterization as an external
threat, with the inﬁltration of a legitimate domestic sphere by outsiders.74
Overall, this leads to transnational organized crime remaining a contested
criminological matter, rather than a juridical or legal term.
B. National Security
As has been outlined, the concepts of organized crime and its transnational
counterpart are hard to delineate. The notion of national security is no less
problematic, and the description of organized crime as a threat to this is
facilitated by the extension of the latter.
National security, insofar as it denotes the existence and survival of the
state, was once understood primarily in a military sense, and any threats
were seen as deriving from other nations. Such an understanding was
predicated on the Weberian conception of the state, with political institu-
tions that are constituted and authorized to govern a given area, and with
the retention of a monopoly on the use of force in this territory.75
Encroachments on state sovereignty, through military force or espionage,
constituted attacks on national security.
The ambiguity of the concept of national security and its potential to
cause confusion has long been recognized.76 Richards described national
72. ALAN WRIGHT, ORGANISED CRIME 23–24 (2006).
73. Edwards & Gill, supra note 5.
74. Id. at 252–53.
75. Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 78
(Hans H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1946) (1919).
76. Arnold Wolfers, ‘‘National Security’’ as an ambiguous symbol, 67 POL. SCI. Q. 481,
483 (1952).
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security as ‘‘a particular articulation of security priorities and concerns put
forward by the political leaders of a state, at a given time in its history.’’77 So
it is a malleable and contingent notion. Indeed, later in the twentieth
century, national security was expanded from a strictly military concept
to a much broader one,78 incorporating political, economic, societal, and
ecological dimensions.79 As Ullman claimed, ‘‘Deﬁning national security
merely (or even primarily) in military terms conveys a profoundly false
image of reality.’’80 So threats to political systems, to the environment, and
to public health, for example, are viewed increasingly as falling within the
rubric of national security. Such extension may be positive, insofar as it
underlines the signiﬁcance of certain communal human interests, and the
gravity and signiﬁcance of their erosion. Strictly speaking, however, such
interests concern human rather than national security.81 Moreover, not all
states share a ‘‘democratic conception’’ of national security,82 and its focus
often remains on the state comprising its institutions rather than on the
nation of people. Moreover, its breadth and vagueness may be problematic.
This ‘‘amorphous, open-ended concept’’ is claimed to be ‘‘amenable to
legal and political manipulation,’’83 and new interpretations have been
criticized for lacking clear boundaries and deﬁnitional parameters.84 Now,
in the ‘‘new security context’’85 various challenges are identiﬁed as threats,
though there is no international conﬂict or war as such. The core issue is
that anything of signiﬁcant political concern can be (re-)deﬁned as a
national security issue, given the loose nature of the term. This is worri-
some because of the consequences that arise, as will be explored more fully
later.
77. RICHARDS, supra note 17, at 17.
78. See BUZAN, supra note 12, at 16–23.
79. See BUZAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 21–29.
80. Richard H. Ullman, Redeﬁning Security, 8 INT’L SECURITY 129 (1983).
81. HUMAN SECURITY AND THE NEW DIPLOMACY: PROTECTING PEOPLE, PROMOT-
ING PEACE (Rob McRae & Don Hubert eds., 2001); THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN
SECURITY (Edward Newman & Oliver P. Richmond eds., 2001); NEIL MACFARLANE,
HUMAN SECURITY AND THE UN: A CRITICAL HISTORY (2006).
82. LAURENCE LUSTGARTEN IAN LEIGH, IN FROM THE COLD: NATIONAL SECURITY
AND PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY, ch. 1 (1994).
83. FIONNUALA NI´ AOLA´IN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS 215 (2006).
84. See, e.g., Daniel Deudney, The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and
National Security, 19 MILLENNIUM: J. INT’L STUD. 461–76 (1990).
85. ANDREAS & NADELMANN, supra note 4, at 190.
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C. Organized Crime as a National Security Threat
As outlined, organized crime now is regarded politically as different from
‘‘ordinary crime,’’ on the understanding that it compromises the state as an
entity, rather than simply involving the victimization of individuals. More-
over, the perception is that transnational organized crime can corrupt gov-
ernance abroad, thereby threatening international stability with ramiﬁcations
for national security. Such understandings are commonplace globally. None-
theless, the particular British political and executive statements outlined
above do not deﬁne the key terms involved, nor do they explain always the
reasoning behind this comparison. So it is unclear whether organized crime is
deemed to be a national security threat through its challenge to the existence
of the/a state and its institutions, or through the gravity and extent of the
threat it poses to the populace and to the conducting of ‘‘normal life.’’
Regardless of the jurisdiction, transnational organized crime may be
called a ‘‘hard’’ threat insofar as it portends or involves paramilitary action,
or a ‘‘softer’’ threat, whichmay impact on the stability of the political process
and the economy. At one end of the spectrum, organized crime has been
equated to terrorism and thus threatens national security as a matter of
deﬁnition. Here national security is construed in the traditional military
sense, and organized crime is seen as generating alternative armed forces
that seek to subvert and replace the arms of the states. For example, as is the
case in Mexico, members of organized crime groups may have been trained
militarily,86 or may be part of or have corrupted the state’s intelligence
agencies. More broadly, organized crime may be conceived as threatening
national security through a variety ofmeans: the co-option and corruption of
ofﬁcials and ofﬁcial structures, the ﬂouting of the rule of law through impu-
nity, the cultivation of illegal economies, the gravity and nature of the harms
perpetrated, and the overspill of violence into civil society.
Certainly, transnational organized crime is akin to terrorism insofar as
there is often a transnational dimension to many terrorist groups, as many
require foreign support and ﬁnancing. Moreover, as noted above, drug
trafﬁcking and other quintessential organized crimes may fund terrorism,
and some hybrid groups incorporate elements of both.87 So, it may be
86. See Astorga & Shirk, supra note 21, at 49–50. Also see VANDA FELBAB-BROWN,
CALDERO´N’S CALDRON: LESSONS FROM MEXICO’S BATTLE AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME
AND DRUG TRAFFICKING IN TIJUANA, CIUDAD JUA´REZ, AND MICHOACA´N (2011).
87. See supra text accompanying note 58.
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contended that transnational organized crime is securitized legitimately,
given that political discourse and popular acceptance is based on a real
threat to the state. Nevertheless, organized crime and transnational orga-
nized crime appear to be different only in degree, rather than in kind.
Whereas transnational organized crime may have more of an empirical
‘‘ﬁt’’ with terrorism, it remains more closely connected to ‘‘standard’’
domestic cases of organized crime. Different modes of policing may be
required to deal with transnational organized crime when compared to
‘‘local’’ organized crime; having said that, they have more in common with
each other than either does with terrorism, and the kinds of emergency and
potential harms presented by (transnational) organized crime remain dif-
ferent to terrorism. This suggests that, conceptually, organized crime, be it
domestic or trans-/international, is distinct from traditional threats to
national security. Moreover, given the ﬂuidity of both concepts, it is ques-
tionable whether this comparison is any more than political rhetoric.
V . THE EMP IR ICAL QUEST ION
Secondly, in an empirical sense, it will be argued that at present domestic
organized crime groups in the United Kingdom cannot pose a threat to
national security, as they are too ephemeral in structure and transient in
form. Moreover, it is not clear whether transnational organized crime poses
such a threat. Though this argument centers on the present state of affairs
in the United Kingdom, some of the observations may be translated to
other contexts.
Much of what is conceived of as organized crime in the United Kingdom
is in fact ‘‘disorganized’’88 or comprises groups assembled on a relatively
short-term basis for speciﬁc projects from a broader pool of professional
criminals in a particular region.89 As Levi notes, highly organized crime is
unlikely to ﬂourish where it is hard to develop corrupt alliances between
criminal justice ofﬁcials, politicians, and supplies of illegal commodities.90
At present, organized crime does not exercise a systematic inﬂuence over the
88. See PETER REUTER, DISORGANIZED CRIME: THE ECONOMICS OF THE VISIBLE
HAND (1983).
89. Levi, supra note 52, 604.
90.Mike Levi, Policing fraud and organised crime, inHANDBOOK OF POLICING 522 (Tim
Newburn ed., 2nd ed. 2008).
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political system in Great Britain.91 In contrast, there is evidence that Maﬁa
groups in Italy and theUnited States, for example, replaced some activities of
state institutions,92 carrying out ‘‘social functions’’ in addition to their cen-
tral ‘‘entrepreneurial acts.’’93 Of course, such an alternative mode of gover-
nance usually is predicated on violence and intimidation rather than any
democratic mandate or consent, and so its harm is undeniable. Nonetheless,
these quasi-governmental actions may legitimize such groups in the eyes of
some of the population.94 There is little evidence of this type of organized
crime in the United Kingdom, of organized criminals controlling elections,
or of political alliances protecting such actors.
Furthermore, there is no evidence in the United Kingdom of the sys-
tematic intimidation or corruption of the judiciary or the prosecution, such
as that crippled the attempt to address organized crime in parts of the
United States in the early twentieth century.95 Nevertheless, Europol indi-
cates that criminal groups may stymie the administration of justice in the
United Kingdom through witness intimidation,96 and there is some lim-
ited evidence of juror corruption.97 In addition, organized crime impacts
the U.K.’s economy, with estimated costs of between £20 and £40 billion
a year.98 It also has been found to corrupt local business structures.99
Whether this sufﬁces to constitute a national security threat is another
matter.
Scepticism about the challenge that domestic organized crime poses
currently for national security in a given jurisdiction is not to be unduly
sanguine about the situation, nor to reject the possibility of a change in
future. It is not inconceivable that organized crime could, one day, reach
a level and extent as to undermine public agencies and processes in the
United Kingdom, and the conﬁdence expressed here in the current state of
91. Paoli & Fijnaut, supra note 48, at 312.
92. See JOHN LANDESCO, ORGANIZED CRIME IN CHICAGO, ch. VIII (1968).
93. Klaus von Lampe, Organised Crime in Europe: Conceptions and Realities, 2 POLICING:
J. POL’Y & PRAC. 7–17 (2008).
94. Ronald Goldstock, Organised Crime in Northern Ireland: A Report For The Secretary
Of State 6 (Northern Ireland Ofﬁce, 2004); PAOLI, supra note 51, at 212.
95. See LANDESCO, supra note 92.
96. Europol, OCTA 2009: EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment, at { 5.6 (2009).
97. Gounev & Bezlov, supra note 55, at 106.
98. Home Ofﬁce, A Plan for the Creation, supra note 45, at { 2.4.
99. OCTA 2009, supra note 96.
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public bodies does not guarantee that they are impermeable to corruption.
But for now, the level of criminality and the resilience of public institutions
suggests otherwise. Moreover, this understanding does not preclude belief
in the effect of heated rhetoric on policy development, and so suggests that
restraint should be exercised in drawing such a comparison.
To be fair, most policy documents in the United Kingdom that present
organized crime as a national security threat presumably are speaking of
transnational organized crime (even if this is not the precise term used), or
at least are referring to organized crime overseas.100 Thus, the corruption of
other countries’ political structures, judicial systems, and economies is
regarded as a phenomenon that threatens U.K. national security. Poor
governance, ethnic separatism, and traditions of criminal activity can sup-
port crime-terror interactions in different global settings,101 and organized
crime may co-opt or ‘‘capture’’ the state and its institutions if they are weak
or in transition.102 Of course, intention to subvert the state on the part of
criminal groups is not necessary for it to constitute a national security threat.
For example, transnational organized crime, through the construction of
illegal economies in an otherwise legitimate system, may be seen as threat-
ening the national security of theUnitedKingdom, given that the generation
of proﬁts can rival GDP.103Moreover, in some countries, the narcotics trade
provides a majority or very signiﬁcant proportion of the revenue, and cor-
ruption and direct state involvement is commonplace.104
Empirically, it is a matter of judgment and debate whether or not
organized crime constitutes a national security threat, especially given the
100. However, the Government has noted that the National Security Council needs to
increase its focus on domestic security issues, including organized crime. This may be in-
terpreted as suggesting that domestic organized crime also is regarded as a national security
threat. Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, Planning for the next National
Security Strategy: Comments on the Government response to the Committee’s First Report of
Session 2010–12, First Report of Session 2012–13, HL Paper 27 HC 423, at 15–16 (2012),
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201213/jtselect/jtnatsec/27/27.pdf.
101. Shelley et al., supra note 59.
102. Phil Williams & Doug Brooks, Captured, criminal and contested states: Organised
crime and Africa in the 21st century, 6 S. AFR. J. INT’L AFF. 81–99 (1999); Edgardo Buscaglia
& Jan van Dijk, Controlling Organized Crime and Corruption in the Public Sector, 3F. ON
CRIME & SOC’Y 3–34, 8 (2003).
103. UNODC, supra note 11, at 13.
104. Niklas Swanstrom, The Narcotics Trade: A Threat to Security? National and
Transnational Implication, 8 GLOBAL CRIME 1–25, 4 (2007).
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deﬁnitional ambiguities involved. The United Nations Ofﬁce on Drugs
and Crime stated that a clear sign that crime has become a national security
threat is when exceptional legal and security measures are taken, including
calling on the military to help re-establish the government’s authority.105
This seems to put the cart before the horse, so to speak, in stating that the
reaction of the state deﬁnes the nature and extent of the problem. Bailey,
referring to the situation in Mexico, speaks of a tipping point whereby
a ‘‘chronic but tolerable problem of public security . . . become[s] a genuine
threat to national security and democratic governance.’’106 The critical
question is what is this critical juncture where may it be said that a really
serious social problem becomes one warranting extreme or extraordinary
measures.
Organized crime may indeed inﬁltrate and corrupt state institutions,
such as has occurred at times in Mexico and Italy, for example. It may
attain sufﬁcient power as to inﬂuence the executive unduly and to under-
mine the integrity of the judicial process. Alternatively, it might come to
exercise sovereignty and usurp state functions in some contexts. If so, then
there may be a justiﬁcation for at least treating the relevant organizations as
a national security threat on an ad hoc basis. The present situation in the
United Kingdom, however, falls short of this.
V I . DUE PROCESS
The tension between liberty and security, which has been expertly
rehearsed and analyzed elsewhere,107 is especially pronounced when indi-
vidual rights meet and clash with the imperative of national security. This
ﬁnal argument suggests that describing organized crime as a national secu-
rity threat has implications for due process rights in different dimensions,
and so should be resisted to the greatest extent possible. Again, although
105. United Nations Ofﬁce on Drugs and Crime, The Globalization of Crime: A
Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment 11 (2010).
106. John Bailey, Combating Organized Crime and Drug Trafﬁcking in Mexico: What are
Mexican and U.S. Strategies? Are They Working?, in SHARED RESPONSIBILITY: U.S.-
MEXICO POLICY OPTIONS FOR CONFRONTING ORGANIZED CRIME 327 (Eric L. Olson,
Andrew Selee, & David Shirk eds., 2010).
107. See, e.g., LUCIA ZEDNER, SECURITY (2009), and CONOR GEARTY, LIBERTY AND
SECURITY (2013).
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the U.K. situation and British law remain the primary focus, the arguments
made here are of more general application. Firstly, treating organized crime
as a national security threat may have two competing effects in terms of law
creation: although it could detract political attention from the use and
application of extant domestic law, it is more likely that it would generate
a moral panic, thereby contributing to enactment of more repressive leg-
islation. Then, as regards the application of extant rules of criminal pro-
cedure, such assessments may preclude prosecution, limit the material
disclosed at trial, or lead to closed hearings. The ultimate legal consequence
would be a declaration of a state of emergency by the executive, and
associated derogation from certain rights. Critically, the relocation of
a crime problem in the security realm has the potential to affect the ability
of the courts to intervene in monitoring practices that are problematic in
terms of procedural rights.
Before addressing these three points, it is worth noting the general
signiﬁcance of national security in the legal or judicial sense. Though
national security is not deﬁned precisely in U.K. law, it has been described
as constituting a source of power for the executive: a description of state
interest or reason for action, and an exemption from certain rules.108 For
example, despite the absence of deﬁnition, national security is a justiﬁcation
for intrusive surveillance, under Section 32 of the Regulation of Investiga-
tory Powers Act 2000. The Secretary of State or senior authorizing ofﬁcer
may also permit surveillance if he believes that it is necessary in the interests
of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom or to prevent or detect
serious crime. National security exemptions may also be found in the
Freedom of Information Act 2000 and the Data Protection Act 1998.
Furthermore, national security is an approved ground for limiting rights
under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and is
referred to explicitly in various articles. Indeed, many other human rights
instruments permit rights to be limited on the ground of national security,
such as the American Convention on Human Rights and the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights. This concept is not deﬁned in the
ECHR; as the European Commission on Human Rights stressed in Esbseter
v. The United Kingdom, the term ‘‘national security’’ is not amenable to
exhaustive deﬁnition.109 Nevertheless, Cameron notes that it cannot be the
108. LUSTGARTEN & LEIGH, supra note 82, at 321.
109. Esbester v. The United Kingdom (1994) 18 Eur. H.R. Rep. CD 72.
240 | NEW CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | VOL . 17 | NO . 2 | SPR ING 2014
same as public safety, public order, or territorial integrity, given that these
concepts as well as national security are mentioned in the aforementioned
ECHR articles.110 So, though there may be a degree of overlap, the notion is
distinct from these cognate ideas in the European context.111
The imperatives of national security may require states to take certain
actions, such as collecting and storing information on persons for use when
assessing their eligibility for posts of importance for national security, and
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) permits this, as long as
there exist adequate and effective guarantees against abuse.112 The ECtHR
holds the margin of appreciation (that is, the latitude granted to national
authorities in fulﬁlling their duties under the ECHR113) to be wide when
assessing the requirements of and means of pursuing interests of national
security.114 Moreover, ECHR case law indicates that espionage and ter-
rorism, for example, are national security threats.115 This maps onto the
more traditional interpretations of the concept. There has yet to be a case
centering on organized crime as a discrete national security threat.
A. The Creation of Law
Firstly, thinking about and describing organized crime as a matter of
national security has the potential to affect the appraisal and creation of
policy and law. Of course, this claim is arguable in all jurisdictions. On the
one hand, it could relocate political attention from the need for domestic
measures; alternatively, it could ratchet up the severity of the likely legal
reactions. So, this shift in focus has both positive and negative consequences.
Though organized crime may be transnational in nature, and though
many of the reactions and relevant institutions may be international also,
across the world the primary legal responses continue to be domestic ones.
This is not without its critics: Swanstrom laments the use of national
mechanisms to address international security threats,116 and similarly
110. IAIN CAMERON, NATIONAL SECURITY & THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 54 (2000).
111. Id.
112. Klass v. Germany (1980) 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 214, { 50.
113. Steven Greer, The Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation and Discretion under the
European Convention on Human Rights (2000).
114. Leander v. Sweden [1987] 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 433, {{ 58–59.
115. Klass v. Germany (1980) 2Eur.H.R. Rep. 214; and seeCAMERON, supra note 110, at 55.
116. Swanstrom, supra note 104, at 6.
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Baker identiﬁes problems of using criminal law regulation against transna-
tional organized crime, due to deﬁnitional and jurisdictional issues, and
difﬁculties regarding the law of complicity and joint enterprise.117 None-
theless, in the United Kingdom and indeed elsewhere, the substantive
crimes, the rules of criminal procedure, and the laws governing policing
practice remain, to a great extent, domestic.118 This is not to underestimate
the importance of inter-/transnational rules and practices—like measures
deriving from the United Nations, the Financial Action Task Force, and
the European Union119—which steer domestic law but may differ in terms
of how prescriptive they are. By and large, the legal responses to organized
crime remain entrenched in the traditional paradigm of the sovereign state.
Characterizing organized crime as a national security threat may denote
a move toward the government thinking more strategically and preventa-
tively about the issue, not simply assigning blame through the usual means
of the criminal process. This is not problematic in itself, and in fact may be
more effective, operationally and practically. Conversely, refocusing on the
intersection with national security may lead to more institutional and
political neglect of domestic tactics, and less critical appraisal of their
effectiveness. As Baker notes, the conditions that facilitate organized crime
and associated power vacuums need to be addressed,120 but characterizing
organized crime as a security threat and focusing on the transnational
dimension in particular allows for abnegation of responsibility for ineffec-
tive responses at the local level, such as has occurred in some E.U. accession
states.121 Overall, we could indeed question whether transnational orga-
nized crime groups are ‘‘semi-intangible phenomena’’ created speciﬁcally to
conceal the relative lack of success against organized crime.122
117. Estella Baker, The Legal Regulation of Transnational Organised Crime: Opportunities
and Limitations, in Edwards & Gill, supra note 1, at 184; also see Jens David Ohlin, Joint
Intentions, in RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW THEORY: NEW CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES IN
THE PHILOSOPHY OF DOMESTIC, TRANSNATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
267–90 (Franc¸ois Tanguay-Renaud & James Stribopoulos eds., 2012).
118. See Hobbs, supra note 53.
119. See TOMOYA OBOKATA, TRANSNATIONAL ORGANISED CRIME IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2010).
120. Baker, supra note 117.
121. Paddy Rawlinson, Bad Boys in the Baltic, in Edwards & Gill, supra note 1, at 132.
122. Monica den Boer, Foreword, in, DEFINING AND DEFYING ORGANIZED CRIME:
DISCOURSE, PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY, xvii (Felia Allum, Francesca Longo, Daniela
Irrera, & Panos A. Kostakos eds., 2012).
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In the United Kingdom, some existing legal measures used to deal with
organized criminality are questionable in terms of their application and
effectiveness, such as serious crime prevention orders123 and civil asset
recovery.124 One could argue that reframing the debate to encompass
national security will shift political attention even further from the success
of measures already introduced. However, it is more likely that references
to organized crime as a national security threat will operate in tandem
rather than replace domestic reactions, thereby augmenting the range and
scope of legal responses.
The second aspect of this concern about the effect on lawmaking is the
potential heightening of anxiety and generation of a moral panic. Here
the ‘‘folk devils’’125 of organized crime are regarded as challenging not only
the safety of society but also national security. This rhetoric, be it over-
blown or otherwise, may elevate the perceived need for robust measures
against such criminality domestically.
A range of measures has been introduced dealing with organized crime
that is problematic in terms of due process protections, and the process of
securitization would contribute to more such legislation. One example is
the introduction of statute law governing anonymous witness evidence.
The House of Lords had ruled against such a practice in R v. Davis126:
although the reality and extent of witness intimidation was not disputed by
the Law Lords,127 the protective anonymizing measures in this instance
were found to have so hampered the defense enough to render the trial
unfair and incompatible with Article 6 of the ECHR.128 This necessitated
legislative action to reconstruct a scheme that complied with the Conven-
tion, taking the form of the Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act
2008. Though Davis centered on witness intimidation and the right to
123. See Serious Crime Act 2007, Pt. 1.
124. Proceeds of Crime Act 2002; see Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Court Adminis-
tration, Payback Time—Joint Review of Asset Recovery since The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002
(2004); Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary for Scotland (HMICS) and the
Inspectorate of Prosecution in Scotland, Joint Thematic Report on The Proceeds of Crime Act
2002 (2009).
125. STAN COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS: THE CREATION OF THE MODS
AND ROCKERS (1972).
126. R v. Davis; R v. Ellis [2006] EWCA Crim 1155; [2008] UKHL 36.
127. Id. at { 27.
128. Id. at {{ 35 and 61.
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confrontation, Bingham J. noted that historically concern about ‘‘national
security and intimidation of witnesses’’ led to reliance on secret, anonymous
evidence, such as in the notorious Court of Star Chamber.129 National
security also was cited further in the debate on the subsequent Bill, where
it was noted that in such cases, not even the court will know of the identity of
the witness.130 Though national security was not determinative in eroding
the right to confrontation, this demonstrates that at one time such ameasure
was deemed relevant due to such concerns, and will be at its most potent in
those cases.
The danger in the context of organized crime is the conﬂation by U.K.
policymakers of a very serious social issue and a national emergency,131
thereby increasing the acceptance of once extraordinary measures in a wider
setting. Deploying the language of national security in relation to organized
crime increases the likelihood of further robust reactions to this form of
criminality, and ﬁts with Ashworth’s imagined security model of criminal
justice,132 with the seepage of extraordinary measures into a wider context.
B. The Application of Law
The second scenario to be considered is where organized crime is treated as
a national security threat in speciﬁc cases. This involves a shift from dis-
course to praxis, with reference to prosecution particularly.
It is true that investigations into organized crime and terrorism may
involve highly sensitive material that could directly threaten national secu-
rity.133 Initially, if a particular case of organized crime is seen as touching on
such matters, there is a question of whether a prosecution will be brought at
all,134 if disclosed material could compromise investigative techniques or
affect international relations or cooperation in terms of intelligence sharing.
Then, if a case involving national security matters proceeds to trial, a special
process is adopted. In the United Kingdom, public interest immunity (PII)
129. Id. at { 5.
130. Commons’ Consideration of Lords; amendments, 16 July 2008: col. 368, per the
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Maria Eagle).
131. BARBARA HUDSON, JUSTICE IN THE RISK SOCIETY: CHALLENGING AND RE-
AFFIRMING ‘‘JUSTICE’’ IN LATE MODERNITY 218 (2003).
132. Andrew Ashworth, Security, Terrorism and the Value of Human Rights, in SECURITY
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 203–26, 218 (Ben Goold & Liora Lazarus, eds., 2007).
133. Crown Prosecution Service, CPS Disclosure Manual 9.2–9.3 (2005).
134. LUSTGARTEN & LEIGH, supra note 82, at 292.
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may be sought. Although generally the prosecution bears a statutory duty to
disclose to the defense all relevant evidence and material,135 PII may be
claimed if disclosure could cause real damage to a public interest, such as
revealing the existence or nature of surveillance. The Crown Prosecution
Service (CPS) may apply to the courts for PII, or a PII certiﬁcate may be
authorized and signed by aMinister in the case ofGovernmentmaterial. The
court will then assess whether the concerns prompting the grant of the
certiﬁcate outweigh the norm of open justice. The type of hearing is deter-
mined by the level of sensitivity of the information involved: in type 1 cases,
the prosecutor informs the defense of the category of sensitive material, and
the defense may make representations at an inter partes hearing; in type 2
cases, the defense is informed of the immunity application but not of the
category of material, the hearing is ex parte, and the defendant is represented
by special counsel appointed by the court; and for type 3 cases, the defense is
not notiﬁed, but his or her interests again are represented by court-appointed
special counsel.136
PII seeks to balance the tension between the principle of open and fair
administration of justicewith the nondisclosure of sensitive information that
may compromise interests such as national security. This ‘‘derogation from
the golden rule of full disclosure’’ must be theminimumnecessary to protect
the public interest in the effective investigation and prosecution of serious
crime and must never threaten the fairness of the trial.137 This process is
compliant with Article 6 of the ECHR, which safeguards the fairness of the
criminal trial—as the ECtHR stressed in Kennedy v. United Kingdom, the
entitlement to disclosure of relevant evidence is not an absolute right.138
Though PII remedies concerns about potentially harmful revelations in
court and thus may safeguard national security, problematic issues may
arise regarding the relation between the defendant and special counsel. Any
interaction and communication between them is limited, and once special
counsel has viewed the sensitive material, restrictions apply to the instruc-
tions he or she may receive. Moreover, the special counsel might not make
the best or most effective arguments before the judge, as the special counsel
135. Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, as amended by the Criminal Justice
Act 2003.
136. R v. Davis, Johnson and Rowe [1993] 1 WLR 613.
137. R v. H and C [2004] UKHL 3 para 18.
138. Kennedy v. The United Kingdom (2011) 52 Eur. H.R. Rep. 4 [187].
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might not contest the failure to disclose material that, unknown to the
special counsel, could assist the defense. Essentially, the relationship with
the defendant lacks the quality of conﬁdence inherent in any ordinary
lawyer-client relationship.139 Nonetheless, the ECtHR in Kennedy v. The
United Kingdom noted that restrictions on the right to a fully adversarial
procedure are permissible in criminal proceedings where this is ‘‘strictly
necessary in the light of a strong countervailing public interest, such as
national security.’’140 Thus, construing organized crime as a national secu-
rity threat has real implications for the right to an adversarial process.
There are yet more drastic consequences in the context of civil proceed-
ings in the United Kingdom relating to organized crime involving ‘‘sensi-
tive material’’ that would damage national security if disclosed. Part Two of
the Justice and Security Act 2013 permits the courts to make a declaration
permitting what is called ‘‘closed material applications’’ if sensitive material
would be disclosed, or if it would be if not subject to PII, and if it is in the
interests of the fair and effective administration of justice.141 The Secretary
of State may not make an application for such a declaration unless he or she
has considered whether to make, or advise another person to make, a claim
for PII in relation to the particular material.142 Once this declaration is in
place, an application may be made by the person who would need to
disclose material so that disclosure would be to the court, the special
advocate representing the interests of the excluded individual, and the
Secretary of State only.143
Though there has been no reference in parliamentary debate to organized
crime as justifying such measures, the Serious Organised Crime Agency
(SOCA)144 sees the availability of these closedmaterial procedures as impor-
tant in the context of such crime, beyond situations where PII is used as the
standard mechanism for protecting sensitive material from disclosure.145
139. R v. H and C, supra note 137, at { 22.
140. Kennedy v. The United Kingdom, supra note 138, at [184].
141. Justice and Security Act 2013, Part II, § 6.
142. Id. at § 6(7).
143. Id. at § 6(8).
144. SOCA was replaced by the National Crime Agency in October 2013; see Crime and
Courts Act 2013, Schedule 8.
145. SOCA, Justice and Security Green Paper: SOCA response to consultation, { 2, http://
consultation.cabinetofﬁce.gov.uk/justiceandsecurity/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/66_
SOCA.pdf
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SOCA noted that activity against organized crime ‘‘like against other
national security threats’’ involves sensitive capabilities and techniques,146
thereby justifying such radical measures. Indeed, this process could apply to
civil forfeiture proceedings and to civil actions by police informers, for
example. The closed material procedure is deeply problematic, given the
circumscription of open justice and the limitation of the adversarial process.
Notwithstanding the contentious issues around open justice and the
quality and nature of legal representation in PII and closed hearings, the
increasingly common characterization of organized crime as a national
security threat in the political sphere will not necessarily lead to any
increased prosecution applications for PII. Each case is considered individ-
ually, and moreover, challenges to other public interests like policing pro-
vide a legitimate basis for PII applications currently. Nonetheless, as is
explored further below, the courts demonstrate a marked reluctance to
intervene in the context of national security concerns, and so the reliance
on the discourse of national security by the applicant for PII may guarantee
court approval. In addition, the imperative of combating organized crime
lends weight to the enactment of more expansive provisions, such as in the
Justice and Security Act 2013.
C. Derogation from Law
The ﬁnal potential development is the translation of this rhetoric about
organized crime as a national security threat into its treatment as such in
a general sense, through the declaration of a state of emergency. As Gross
observes, deﬁning an emergency is not easy,147 and clearly demarcating
such a state from normalcy may not always be possible.148 Nonetheless, the
paradigmatic understanding is one of a temporary break from the norm
resulting from a particular event or situation.149 If concern about organized
crime ever became so pronounced in the United Kingdom as to move from
rhetoric to executive action, a formal declaration could be made under
Article 15 of the ECHR, which permits derogation from Convention obliga-
tions in time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of
146. Id. at { 1.
147. Oren Gross, Once more unto the breach, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 437 (1998).
148. Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Consti-
tutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1022 (2003).
149. Gross, supra note 147, at 439–40.
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the nation, to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the crisis.150
Such notices of derogation were made in 1971, 1973, and 1975 by the United
Kingdom relating to the political situation in Northern Ireland and the
level of paramilitary violence there. In Ireland v. the United Kingdom, the
parties were agreed, as were the Commission and the Court, that the Article
15 criteria were satisﬁed in these instances, since terrorism had for a number
of years represented ‘‘a particularly far-reaching and acute danger for the
territorial integrity of the United Kingdom, the institutions of the six
counties and the lives of the province’s inhabitants.’’151 Whereas compar-
isons are drawn between the extent and effect of organized crime and the
threat of paramilitary crime in Northern Ireland,152 in the case of the
declarations such derogations were made explicitly and, though controver-
sial, were predicated on a deﬁned and evident problem.
As was argued above, the current level and extent of organized crime in
the United Kingdom suggests that such a declaration is highly unlikely to
occur, save for a dramatic change in circumstances. Moreover, as Poole
notes, emergency powers are now usually statutory rather than exercises of
executive power,153 and this can obscure the distinction between what
should be treated as normal and as exceptional.154 This brings us back
to the concern about rhetoric leading to statutory measures that encroach
on civil liberties, rather than to executive exercises of the prerogative against
organized crime, or reliance on Article 15 of the ECHR to permit deroga-
tions from particular rights.
D. Judicial Deference
The fundamental concern regarding the treatment of organized crime as
a national security threat by the prosecution or the executive is the judicial
deference this would involve.155 As Lord Steyn stated in the House of
Lords in Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Rehman, what is
150. See A v. The United Kingdom (2009) 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. 29 { 173ff.
151. Ireland v. The United Kingdom (1979–80) Eur. H.R. Rep. 25.
152. See Organised Crime Task Force, supra note 60, at 16; An Garda Sı´ocha´na, supra
note 60, at 6.
153. Thomas Poole, Constitutional exceptionism and the common law, INT’L J. CONST. L.
247, 253 (2009).
154. Id. at 257.
155. See Adam Tomkins, National Security and the Due Process of Law, 64 CURRENT
LEGAL PROBS. 215 (2011); LUSTGARTEN & LEIGH, supra note 82, at 323.
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meant by ‘‘national security’’ is a question of construction, and is not
a question of law but a matter of judgment and policy on the part of the
executive.156 Safeguarding national security is a fundamental role and duty
of Government, and courts have little knowledge or expertise in the empir-
ical or practical dimensions of such assessments.157 Lord Diplock encap-
sulated this in his statement in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for
the Civil Service:
National security is the responsibility of the executive government; what
action is needed to protect its interests is . . . a matter on which those on
whom the responsibility rests, and not the courts of justice, must have the
last word. It is par excellence a non-justiciable question. The judicial process
is totally inept to deal with the sort of problems which it involves.158
Moreover, as the U.K. Government’s Justice and Security Green Paper
emphasized, there are few cases in which the courts do not uphold the
Government’s claim that public interest immunity is warranted.159 This
strict demarcation of which matters are justiciable and which are the pre-
serve of the executive may stymie effective oversight of decisions not to
disclose certain materials, or to hold closed proceedings.
Such deference is not limited to domestic law and courts. The decision
in Glasenapp v. Germany, for example, demonstrates that the European
Court of Human Rights also is prepared to take quite an expansive view of
national security, and to yield to executive determinations and require-
ments in this context.160 In Glasenapp the obligation on civil servants to
be loyal and to guarantee the upholding of the free democratic constitu-
tional system within the meaning of the Basic Law was seen to defend the
constitutional institutions of the state and thus was a matter of national
security in the wider sense.161 However, in Chahal v. The United Kingdom,
the ECtHR emphasized that national security issues are not inherently
156. Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Rehman [2001] UKHL 47 [50].
Here, national security was the ground on which the Home Secretary of State was con-
sidering a deportation conducive to the public good.
157. R (Binyam Mohamed) v. The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs [2010] EWCA Civ 65 [131].
158. Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, 412.
159. U.K. Government, Justice and Security Green Paper [2.77] (Cm 8194) (2011).
160. Glasenapp v. Germany (1986) 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25.
161. See CAMERON, supra note 110, at 55.
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incapable of being tested in a court.162 This case concerned the deportation
of Chahal on the grounds that his continued presence in the United
Kingdom compromised national security. The ECtHR stressed that
whereas the use of conﬁdential material may be unavoidable where national
security is concerned, this does not imply that national authorities are free
from control by the domestic courts whenever they choose to assert that
national security and terrorism are involved.163 The ECtHR further
stressed the need to accommodate legitimate security concerns about the
nature and sources of intelligence information with the need for procedural
justice.164
Despite this judicial openness to appraise national security decisions and
actions, it remains the case that the courts display considerable deference to
the executive in this context. Moreover, as outlined above, it is unlikely
that closed material procedures and the system of special advocates incor-
porate sufﬁcient protections for the individual. So it is suggested here that
this classiﬁcation of organized crime should be resisted, because of the legal
and due process implications.
CONCLUS ION
This article has challenged the growing tendency to describe organized
crime as a national security threat, drawing on deﬁnitional, empirical, and
legal arguments. Though it referred to the United Kingdom and British law
for the most part, the conceptual arguments are of broader relevance. One
may feel that, ultimately, it does not matter whether, to what extent, or
how organized crime constitutes a national security threat, as this is an
executive determination of a political state of affairs. What this article has
sought to emphasize is the worrying degree to which depicting organized
crime as a national security threat can stymie or limit debate, both polit-
ically and judicially,165 and the potential consequences for domestic legal
practice and due process norms.
162. Chahal v. The United Kingdom (1997) 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413.
163. Id. at [131].
164. Id.
165. Woodiwiss & Hobbs, supra note 41, at 123, referring to MARK FINDLAY, GOV-
ERNING THROUGH GLOBALISED CRIME (2008); also RICHARD ERICSON, CRIME IN AN
INSECURE WORLD 48 (2006).
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National security threats sometimes may justify deviation from ordinary
due process. The central rationale underpinning such procedural rights is
that they safeguard against the conviction and punishment of innocent
people. So, if compelling evidence suggests that observing these rights in
particular cases would result in many innocent people being harmed, then
there may be some case for overriding these rights. This provides the
rationale for limiting rights in relation to terrorism, for example, even
though this theoretical possibility of limiting certain rights to protect others
is unlikely to be true in practice. And of course, such a consequentialist
argument provides questionable justiﬁcation for overriding individual
rights.
This suggests that the strongest justiﬁcation for legal exceptionalism in
relation to national security relates to state sovereignty. Where there is
a risk that certain people or organizations pose a threat to the state’s legal
authority over a territory or activity, the state might be justiﬁed in defend-
ing itself against these threats, through the adoption of special legal mea-
sures and rules. Even the most severe ‘‘ordinary’’ criminal threat to citizens
does not justify equivalent measures to those preserving state sovereignty
and authority.
One may dismiss such concerns about describing organized crime as
a national security threat by emphasizing that the rhetoric has not yet been
translated into widespread practice in a legal or procedural sense. None-
theless, such a comparison should be opposed, not least given inherent
vagueness in deﬁnitions of key terms; the inability to ﬁrst deﬁne and then
eliminate organized crime means that it serves as a constant means of
justifying robust state action and statutory creation. Moreover, it should
be resisted most critically because of the potential ramiﬁcations, regarding
secrecy, accountability, and judicial oversight. Calling (transnational) orga-
nized crime a national security threat maintains a view of such crime as
‘‘other,’’ as external, as distinct from corporate crime, and ignores public
complicity. It is suggested that debate on and reaction to a criminal prob-
lem must remain within the criminal law framework, to guard against
securitization and the normalization of extraordinary legal measures in the
face of an ever-shifting and resilient threat.
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